The missing link: bringing institutions back into the debate on economic globalisation by Djelic, Marie-Laure & Quack, Sigrid
www.ssoar.info
The missing link: bringing institutions back into the
debate on economic globalisation
Djelic, Marie-Laure; Quack, Sigrid
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Djelic, M.-L., & Quack, S. (2002). The missing link: bringing institutions back into the debate on economic globalisation.
(Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Arbeitsmarkt
und Beschäftigung, Abteilung Organisation und Beschäftigung, 02-107). Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für
Sozialforschung gGmbH. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-113316
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
 discussion paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FS I 02 - 107 
 
The Missing Link: Bringing Institutions back 
into the Debate on Economic Globalisation 
 
 
Marie-Laure Djelic, Sigrid Quack 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dezember 2002 
ISSN Nr. 1011-9523 
 
 
e-mail: sigrid@wz-berlin.de 
 
Marie-Laure Djelic 
Kerstin Hesselgren-Professorin an der 
Uppsala Universität, Schweden 
 
ESSEC, France 
Avenue Bernard Hirsch - Bp 105 
95021 Cergy-Pontoise 
France 
Phone: +33 1 34 43 30 52 
Telefax: +33 1 34 43 32 10 
E-mail: djelic@essec.fr 
ZITIERWEISE / CITATION 
 
 
 
Marie-Laure Djelic, Sigrid Quack 
 
The Missing Link: Bringing Institutions back 
into the Debate on Economic Globalisation 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper FS I 02 -107 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung 2002 
 
 
Forschungsschwerpunkt: Research Area: 
Arbeitsmarkt und Labour Market and 
Beschäftigung Employment 
 
 
Abteilung: Research Unit: 
Organisation und Organization and 
Beschäftigung Employment 
 
 
 Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung 
 Reichpietschufer 50 
 D-10785 Berlin 
 
Abstract 
Faced with ongoing debates on globalisation, societal institutionalism in its tra-
ditional form is showing its limits. In this paper, we suggest that a serious 
sociologically grounded and institutional contribution to the ongoing debate on 
global governance calls for a shift in focus – away from the preoccupation with 
national configurations and towards an attempt at understanding transnational 
recombinations. The investigation of transnational recombination calls for new 
analytical tools. Here we argue that the solution may come from an hybridisa-
tion of NBS and VOC approaches with other variants of the institutionalist 
argument in particular those we label ‘cultural’ or ‘phenomenological’. We elabo-
rate on three aspects of institutional analysis that we identify as key to getting a 
better understanding of the relationship between globalisation and institutions. 
Firstly, we propose an interpretation of institutionalisation as a process and not 
a state of things. Secondly, we reinterpret institutional genesis and institutional 
change as revealing recombination. Thirdly, we argue for a more systematic 
analysis of the interplay of such processes of  recombination across different 
levels of analysis, particularly the national and the transnational.  
With a conceptual framework so reformulated, it is possible to take in the 
transnational reality in its full complexity. We show, on the one hand, how the 
NBS and VOC perspectives are an interesting starting base to look at the 
structuration and stabilisation of the transnational reality. On the other hand, we 
gain new insights in the ways in which institution building and recombination at 
the transnational level become reflected – often progressively and somewhat 
incrementally – at the national business system level. Our proposition is that the 
succession and combination, over a long period of time, of a series of incre-
mental and sometimes minor transformations could lead in the end to conse-
quential and significant change. 
Zusammenfassung 
In der Auseinandersetzung mit der Globalisierung von Wirtschaftsprozessen 
kann sich die sozialwissenschaftliche Institutionentheorie nicht mehr auf die 
Untersuchung nationaler Konfigurationen beschränken, sondern sollte der 
transnationalen Rekombination institutioneller Arrangements mehr Aufmerk-
samkeit schenken. Für die Untersuchung solcher Prozesse sind veränderte 
analytische Werkzeuge erforderlich. Die Autorinnen dieses Beitrags schlagen 
eine Synthese von „National Business Systems-“ und „Varieties of Capitalism-“ 
Ansätzen mit kulturalistischen und phänomenologischen Varianten der Institu-
tionentheorie vor. Es werden drei Aspekte der institutionellen Analyse vertieft, 
die zu einem besseren Verständnis des Verhältnisses von Globalisierung und 
Institutionen beitragen: Institutionalisierung als Prozeß, Rekombination als 
Mechanismus der Institutionengenese und des Institutionenwandels und eine 
Mehrebenenanalyse des Zusammenspiels von institutionellen Veränderungen 
auf nationaler und transnationaler Ebene. 
Die vorgeschlagene Synthese verschiedener institutionalistischer Ansätze 
bietet einerseits Ansatzpunkte für die Untersuchung der Rolle nationaler Akteu-
re in der Genese und Entwicklung transnationaler Institutionen. Andererseits 
trägt sie zu einem besseren Verständnis der Rekombination von Elementen 
verschiedener institutioneller Arrangements  sowie der Herausbildung neuer 
Institutionen auf transnationaler Ebene bei. Diese Entwicklungen im transnatio-
nalen Raum wirken wiederum auf Institutionen in nationalen Sozial- und Wirt-
schaftsräumen ein. Die Autorinnen des vorliegenden Beitrages argumentieren, 
daß die Abfolge und Kombination einer Reihe gradueller und zunächst gering-
fügiger Veränderungen über einen längeren Zeitraum hinweg zu einem signifi-
kanten Wandel von gesellschaftlichen Institutionen führen können.  
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1 
1 Introduction1 
Globalisation is a word that suffers from overuse. It has been tainted, further-
more, by its association with overly simplistic images of a ‘runaway world’, of a 
technologically driven global village in the making (Ohmae 1990, Friedman 
2000, Giddens 2000). Still, behind the over-stretched concept lies the contem-
porary reality of an economic world that is not fully contained nor constrained by 
national boundaries. Economic organisation and coordination increasingly reach 
across national borders and the impact is being felt both within the transnational 
sphere and, through rebound and indirect impact, also at the national level. 
What happens to established patterns of economic organisation and co-
ordination when actors move out of their local and national contexts and extend 
their horizon and experience to other local or national spheres where social 
relations are structured differently? What happens in the space in between 
national economies, the transnational arena, where actors originating from dif-
ferent local and national backgrounds meet and interact in ways that become 
increasingly structured and institutionalised? Those questions, we propose, 
point to an important research frontier in economic sociology today. The object 
of this paper is to start striding towards that frontier. 
In the classical tradition, going from Weber (1978) to Veblen (1904) and 
Polanyi (1944), economic sociology has treated economic activity as being 
deeply embedded in wider institutional frames and schemes of societal and po-
litical relationships. This insight has been taken up anew quite strongly in the 
last decade or so with the revival of economic sociology and the multiplication of 
neo-institutional accounts (Guillén 2001). A fair number of those neo-institu-
tional accounts, especially in sociology and political science, point to the socie-
tal or national level as highly structuring and constitutive historically of the insti-
tutional frames that embed economic activity. We use the broad label societal 
institutionalism to refer to those accounts. We put under this label a wide range 
of work – from historical institutionalism (Campbell et al. 1991, Hollingsworth 
and Boyer 1997), to the societal school (Maurice and Sorge 2000), the national 
business systems or varieties of capitalism traditions (Whitley 1999, Hall and 
Soskice 2001), the regulation school (Boyer et al. 1998, Boyer and Sailard 
                                            
1 This paper has been presented at the EGOS Colloquium in Barcelona, 2002. We thank the 
participants of the standing working group ‘Comparative Study of Economic Organization’ as 
well as Sebastian Botzem and Dieter Plehwe for their critical comments and helpful sugges-
tions for revisions. We are particularly grateful to John Meyer for his stimulating comments 
on an earlier draft of this paper. 
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2002) as well as some cultural variants of the neo-institutional argument 
(Dobbin 1994).  
Those different strands of societal institutionalism all depict national 
economies as essentially stable configurations embedded in robust national 
institutional frames. As a consequence, they predict a perpetuation of differ-
ences across national borders if not further divergence, even under strong 
pressures for change (Whitley 1999, Maurice and Sorge 2000, Hall and Soskice 
2001). However, increasing evidence that national economies are evolving, 
sometimes significantly, points to the limits of this type of perspective. For 
societal institutionalism, the challenge in the coming years will be to bring 
change back in rather than evacuate it. Instead of denying or belittling the im-
pact of external pressures on national systems, in particular those stemming 
from the transnational sphere, there is a need for factoring them in. This will 
probably require a reconsideration of some key tenets of societal institutional-
ism. In the process, we contend, the institutionalist perspective can contribute to 
the reinterpretation of globalisation by proposing more subtle and complex pic-
tures of transnational economic interactions and governance patterns than is 
usually the case in the globalisation literature.  
The paper is structured in the following way.  In the first section, we briefly 
review the limits of societal institutionalism and we look at recent attempts to 
overcome these limits. In the second section of the paper, we propose to extend 
the reach of the societal institutionalist analytical framework to take in the trans-
national reality in its full complexity. Then, in the third section, we show how 
societal institutionalism, once reformulated and transformed, is an interesting 
starting base to look at the structuration and stabilisation of the transnational 
reality. We propose to reinterpret globalisation as transnational institutional 
recombination. Finally, we bridge levels of analysis in the last section. We gain 
new insights into the ways in which institution building and recombination at the 
transnational level become reflected – often progressively and somewhat 
incrementally – at the national level, leading in time to national institutional 
change. In the conclusion we discuss the implications for future research, at a 
conceptual and methodological level, and the potential contribution of such a 
reformulated institutionalist perspective to both the literature on globalisation 
and that on institutional change. 
2 Globalisation as Challenge to Societal Institutionalism 
The label ‘societal institutionalism’ refers to what is now a dense set of concep-
tual and empirical studies focusing on the historical emergence and contempo-
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rary structuring of national economies. Research under this label has shown 
how the organisation of firms, as well as inter-organisational forms of economic 
coordination, vary from one national institutional system to another. Societal 
institutionalism has related the structures and strategies of firms, the relation-
ships between different stakeholder groups, the roles of managers, the devel-
opment and distribution of skills between various layers of employees to the 
distinct social and institutional settings in which firms operate. Furthermore, it 
has shown that patterns of industry specialisation, coordination between differ-
ent economic actors, and the capabilities and competencies resulting from 
these interactions are equally influenced by the institutional setting.  
2.1 Societal institutionalism – pointing to the limits 
This literature has been extremely helpful in that it has provided an alternative 
to overly simplistic and decontextualized models of economic action so domi-
nant in economic theory and business studies. A number of weaker points, 
however, have emerged and have become increasingly identified as such over 
the past few years.  
First, societal institutionalism has focused on the structuring impact of 
institutional systems only of a national or societal kind. It has paid little attention 
to what was unfolding, either in the space beyond national institutional frames 
or else in subnational spheres. Societal institutionalism has treated national 
economies as isolated and discrete units where patterns of economic organisa-
tion and action stabilise over time as a result of the continued and repeated 
interaction of domestic actors with their national institutional environment. 
Secondly, within this framework the direction of causality has generally run 
from macro-level institutional context to micro- or meso-level forms of organisa-
tion, coordination or action. Societal institutionalism conceives of macro-level 
institutions as independent variables that influence the behaviour of economic 
actors so that specific and relatively stable patterns of organisation and coordi-
nation emerge and are reproduced. Not only has the relationship between 
institutions and economic actors been construed as going essentially one way, 
it has also been conceptualised in a rather deterministic manner. This left little 
room for the actors to select, enact and innovate, be it with respect to their 
organisational and action patterns or with respect to the institutional environ-
ment itself. 
Third, and as a result, societal institutionalism has insisted upon the conti-
nuity and resilience of institutions, building upon in particular the idea of path 
dependencies (Nelson and Winter 1982, David 1993). Societal institutionalism 
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has tended to conceptualise path dependencies in rather general and unspecific 
terms such as the ‘past influences the present’ or even shapes it. There has 
been some allowance in this literature for the gradual and incremental adapta-
tion of particular institutional features but with little impact ultimately on the 
system as a whole. The idea of radical change in the form of abrupt overhaul of 
the system logic need not be evacuated entirely. However, it is bound to be 
extremely rare and it could happen only at exceptional historical junctures 
where the overall geopolitical and national balance of power was deeply dis-
rupted – after destructive wars, during periods of occupation or colonisation or 
at moments of radical regime change such as in Eastern Europe after 1989.  
2.2 The globalisation challenge and early attempts at dealing 
with it 
The main focus of societal institutionalism has been the systemic nature of 
national configurations of institutions. And a key preoccupation of that literature 
has been to show how those stable systems in turn shape and define national 
economic organisations and their self-reproduction. The picture has generally 
been one of multiple closed systems, where each national ensemble – institu-
tions and organisations – functions in relative isolation from the others. Such a 
description of social and economic reality may hold as a kind of ideal type for 
the past – and even there with a varying degree of applicability in different his-
torical periods. It clearly becomes obsolete, however, with the growing transna-
tional interconnectedness of economic actors across the world and the emer-
gence and strengthening of various forms of institutionalised rule systems at the 
transnational level (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000, Djelic and Quack 2003, 
Drori 2003).  
There have been a number of attempts to date to adapt the analytical 
framework of societal institutionalism in a way that can help meet the theoretical 
challenges raised by economic globalisation. These attempts reflect essentially 
three main strategies. One path has been to call into question the conception of 
institutions as fully determining economic organisation and action. The idea, 
instead, is to highlight and look for the degrees of freedom that economic actors 
can enjoy within a given institutional framework. The focus, here, is on the 
existing and potential variety of strategies and behavioural patterns within a 
given society (Sorge 2000) as well as on the tensions that can arise from the 
conflicting interests of different societal groups leading to contradictions within a 
particular societal system and potentially to institutional change (Almond and 
Rubery 2000). In his studies of the German biotech sector, Casper has made 
explicit this critique of societal institutionalism, suggesting that  
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“static descriptions of existing institutional environments must be combined with 
micro-level accounts, tracing how firms, governments, and other actors within the 
economy experiment with, and at times re-configure, the institutional tool-kits at their 
disposal”. (Casper 2000) 
Such micro-level accounts can build upon various theoretical approaches. 
Where Casper (2000) turns to micro-economic theories to bridge the gap 
between dynamic interactions at the level of firms, regulators or policy makers 
and pre-existing institutional frames, others make use of interactionism or realist 
ethnography (Sharpe 2001, 2002). 
A second route for adapting societal institutionalism has been to explore 
what happens when actors or organisations become involved in multiple institu-
tional environments with different and sometimes conflicting rule systems. A 
particularly interesting laboratory here appears to be the multinational company 
and in recent years studies on its nature and development have flourished 
(Lane 2000, Morgan, Kristensen and Whitley 2001). The internationalisation of 
companies creates a ‘battlefield’ where different constituencies enter in conflict 
and negotiate (Kristensen and Zeitlin 2001, Sharpe 2001). Transnational trans-
fers of business practices generally lead to hybridisation of practices at the 
organisational level but also of managerial ‘mental maps’ (Smith and Elger 
2000, Lane 2000). In time, as Christel Lane (2001) argues in the case of Ger-
man pharmaceutical companies, this can trigger a transformation of domestic 
institutions. When change in leading transnational companies reaches a critical 
mass, managers are encouraged or even required to press for institutional 
reforms at the national level. 
A third path, still barely explored, would be to look at the transnational 
arena as an institutionalised or institutionalising space. Hollingsworth and Boyer 
(1997), for example, argue that social systems of production need increasingly 
to be seen as nested within a complex system of regional, national but also 
international arrangements. Whitley (2003) argues that since 1945 the interna-
tional business environment has undergone a transformation from a particular-
istic logic to an increasing formalisation and standardisation of the rules of the 
economic game. So far, however, societal institutionalism has contributed little 
to our understanding of the processes leading to the emergence of new institu-
tional arrangements in the transnational sphere. The few budding attempts, 
recently, at exploring this frontier have built in part upon different theoretical 
backgrounds. Authors like Brunsson and Jacobsson (2000), Morgan (2001a, 
2000b), Djelic and Bensedrine (2001) or Plehwe (2003) look at the actors, pre-
conditions and mechanisms involved in the emergence and transformation of 
institutions in the ‘transnational social space’ (Morgan 2001a).  
A key challenge for societal institutionalism is to move beyond itself to con-
tribute to an understanding of transnational institution building in all its complex-
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ity. Much could be gained, we believe, by looking at institution building in the 
transnational space as revealing in part processes of recombination of pre-
existing institutional elements – the latter having often a national dimension and 
origin. In the following two sections, we draw on a set of empirical studies that 
describe and explore transnational processes of institutionalisation (see Djelic 
and Quack 2003) to develop a more systematic analytical framework. We build 
upon some key insights of societal institutionalism but we attempt to extend its 
reach to the space in between nations by combining it with other variants of the 
institutionalist argument, in particular ‘cultural’ ones that give more attention to 
the normative and cognitive dimensions of institutions (Berger and Luckmann 
1967, Douglas 1986, Scott and Meyer et al. 1994, Jepperson 2000a, 2000b). 
We also bring actors back in and their variable capacity, on the ‘battlefield’, to 
enact, edit or invent structures and institutions. We believe that a blending of 
societal and cultural variants of institutionalism and their cross-fertilisation can 
help reach a deeper understanding of ongoing processes of institutional change 
in relation to globalisation.2 
If we are going to argue that transnational arenas may be institutionalised 
or institutionalising spheres, there is a need we believe to think in turn about the 
potential impact these transnational institutional frames may have on societal 
institutions and hence on national economies. There is a need for bridging lev-
els of analysis and getting, in particular, at a better understanding of the inter-
play between processes of institutionalisation (and de-institutionalisation) at the 
transnational and national levels. This, we propose, is another important chal-
lenge for societal institutionalism to take up in the coming years. In the last sec-
tion of this paper, we start building a framework outlining how this could be 
done. 
3 Extending the Reach of Societal Institutionalism 
Societal institutionalism has undeniably contributed to deepening our under-
standing of economic activity and interactions. It proposes an alternative to 
decontextualized and universalistic models of economic action. And it gets 
much closer than those models, most of the time, to real life patterns and proc-
esses (Hollingsworth et al. 2002). We keep the strong claim of societal institu-
tionalism that economic activity cannot be conceived of in isolation from other 
spheres of social action. Rather, it should be looked at as being deeply embed-
                                            
2 The main difference between our approach and ongoing work around the issues of 
globalisation and Europe in political science lies, we believe, in our more encompassing 
definition of institutions as normative and cognitive arrangements as well as in the attention 
we pay to a wide range of different actors. 
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ded in wider institutional frames. But to extend its reach so that it can take in the 
structuring of economic activity at other than national or societal levels, we point 
essentially in three directions. First, we elaborate on the need to move away 
from a concept of institutional configurations to the more dynamic idea of proc-
esses of institutionalisation and de-institutionalisation. Second, we argue for 
bringing actors back in. Third, we propose a new understanding of institutional 
change.  
3.1 From institutional systems to processes of institutionalisation  
According to Tolbert and Zucker (1996) the emergence of institutions is a proc-
ess in three stages. First, actors develop through recurrent and regular interac-
tions patterned reactions to problems to which shared meanings and under-
standings become attached (see also Berger and Luckmann 1967). This is in 
fact a pre-institutionalisation stage.  
Then these particular meanings and understandings become generalised 
beyond the specific context in which they crystallized. This second stage can be 
called the objectification stage and goes together with the stabilisation of a con-
sensus among social actors about the value of the behavioural patterns and of 
their associated meanings and understandings. This consensus can translate 
into preliminary structures and rules that on the whole remain fragile at this 
semi-institutionalised stage and can still be revised or even challenged.  
The third and last stage of institutionalisation is one of ‘sedimentation’. It is 
characterised both by an even wider spread of patterned behaviours and 
meanings and by the solidification and perpetuation of structures. It is during 
this last stage that institutions can potentially acquire the ‘quality of exteriority’, 
i.e. become taken-for-granted and develop a reality of their own. 
The logical sequencing goes from habitualisation to sedimentation. How-
ever, it is possible in a number of situations to skip the first stage – the habitu-
alisation stage. The diffusion of institutional rules preexisting in a different con-
text represents such a short cut with a direct move into the objectification stage 
(Tolbert and Zucker 1996). Following DiMaggio and Powell (1983), there are 
three main channels for such a process of diffusion – the coercive, the mimetic 
and the normative. All three types of channels may be operative simultaneously 
thus reinforcing each other. They may also alternate or follow each other – the 
coercive channel being supported over time or even replaced by mimetic and 
normative ones (Djelic 1998).  
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Moving from institutions to institutionalisation and thinking about the latter 
as a set of sequential stages – habitualisation, objectification and sedimentation 
– suggests that the level of embeddedness and robustness of institutional rules 
will vary. We propose that certain patterns of social behaviour – those that are 
semi-institutionalised or still at stage one or two – will be more likely to become 
subject to critical evaluation, modification and elimination than others – those 
that are fully institutionalised. Or as Jepperson (1991) puts it, degrees of institu-
tionalisation are best conceived in terms of relative vulnerability to social inter-
vention. Thinking about institutionalisation as a process also implies to think in 
parallel about processes of de-institutionalisation.  
Within a given society, varying patterns of behaviours will coexist that situ-
ate themselves at different stages of institutionalisation. Instead of considering 
the systemic nature of institutional arrangements, we should take in this internal 
diversity and differentiation and the contradictions that it may generate (Sewell 
1992, Clemens and Cook 1999). We should also look at border points or points 
of interface through which alternatives may appear. In this paper, we focus in 
particular on those points of interface that put in contact the national and the 
transnational. Together, those are the cracks in the system – or at its bounda-
ries – that are likely to make it more vulnerable. Those cracks or weaker points 
indicate the more obvious potential loci for change – that is processes of de-
institutionalisation coupled with processes of re-institutionalisation.  
We argue that external pressures can act as triggers. Major shifts in the 
environment, such as long lasting alterations in markets or radical changes in 
technology may play a role. Internationalisation, we add, is also in itself source 
of pressure (see also Westney 1987, Campbell 1993, Djelic 1998, Boyer et al. 
1998). Our claim is that we should combine a focus on internal loci of disrup-
tions and opportunities with an argument on external triggers of change. We 
point to institutional change as emerging where and when internal challenges 
and spaces of opportunity combine with and are being reinforced by external 
triggers and alternatives. Globalisation is in part about the multiplication of con-
figurations of that type. 
3.2 Bringing actors back in 
Moving from the idea of institutional system or configuration to that of combined 
processes of institutionalisation and de-institutionalisation opens the door, we 
have seen, to the possibility of social intervention and hence agency. Institu-
tions are not only constraining; they are also enabling. Institutions are not static 
systems; they are malleable processes.  
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The understanding of institutions presented here as not only constraining 
but also enabling points to the role and significance of actors, that may some-
times deserve the label ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ (Fligstein and Mara-Drita 
1996). Institutional change comes about when certain groups or networks of 
actors develop new patterns of interaction, from scratch or through bricolage, 
when certain groups or networks seize upon patterns existing elsewhere and 
promote them as superior to existing arrangements, working to mobilise as 
large and significant a support as possible for that project (Djelic 2001, Kleiner 
2003).  
The extent and nature of the challenge to institutions or institutionalising 
rule systems will closely depend upon the types of actors involved. From the 
perspective we develop here that the national/transnational interface is impor-
tant to understand changes in national institutional systems, we need in par-
ticular to differentiate between fringe and dominant actors but also between 
domestic and foreign actors.  
Fringe players are located at the periphery of a particular sphere – be it an 
industry, an organisation field or a geographical territory. They tend to have little 
power, low social status and limited access to resources. In situations of relative 
stability and closure of that economic sphere, the seat of change – if any – is 
likely to lie with a few of those fringe players. Most of them will remain power-
less and passive. The few that may take initiative, however, could be quite 
innovative. During periods of stability and closure, local fringe players have 
more incentives than dominant players to experiment with new solutions. These 
experiments are less costly to them in terms of reputation. Those actors are 
also less likely to be sanctioned by central players for violating rule systems 
and, if successful, they have to gain increased power and social status from 
institutional change. Their innovations may become legitimated and institution-
alised through adoption and adaptation by dominant players (Leblebici et al. 
1991, Stearns and Allan 1996, Jones 2002).  
Dominant actors are those who hold a central position in terms of power 
and social status within a particular sphere – be it an industry, an organisational 
field or a geographical territory. Power and status are generally reflected in 
privileged access to resources. During periods of stability and relative closure of 
the economic sphere, dominant local actors will have a tendency to resist 
change. They are likely to have a vested interest in existing institutions. Their 
perception of the world also has a tendency to remain structured by just those 
institutions.  
When a particular economic sphere opens up and competition stemming 
from neighbouring fields heightens up, as is the case for example during peri-
ods of internationalisation, new actors are bound to emerge. Quite often those 
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will be dominant actors from neighbouring fields or, as a particular case of that, 
powerful foreign actors. Dominant foreign players have the strength and 
resources to push along their own rules of the game well beyond their traditional 
boundaries of activity and to attempt to institutionalise them in other spheres. 
They can become ‘missionaries’ of institutional change. Dominant local players 
will have a tendency to resist those changes – at least initially. When external 
pressure builds up, however, and/or when it combines with internal disruptions, 
challenges or crisis it may be the case that dominant local players turn into 
active promoters and agents of change. Examples of that can be found today in 
the Eastern part of the European continent. Nokia in the 1990s is also a well-
known case.  
In the contemporary context of globalisation, we point to another path that 
is particularly operational, we suggest. This is the direct or indirect alliance 
between foreign dominant actors pushing their own rules of the game and a few 
local players that find an interest in sponsoring those alternative rules (Djelic 
1998, Djelic and Ainamo 1999, Djelic and Quack 2003). This kind of alliance 
takes the champions and partisans of status quo and stability through a pincer 
movement.  
3.3 A ‘stalactite’ model of change – incremental but consequenial 
Societal institutionalism generally underscores the interdependence and close 
integration of institutional elements within any single national system. A com-
mon argument in that tradition is that national systems are self-reinforcing and 
hence quite stable equilibria. The idea is that pressures at the level of certain 
institutional dimensions are likely to be neutralized and absorbed by the system 
as a whole, leaving little or no traces behind. The possibility of change is not 
ruled out but it appears quite unlikely in this framework since in fact for it to 
happen most if not all constitutive elements of the system would have to evolve 
or be transformed simultaneously.  
This indeed will be rare if not totally unlikely, including in situations of 
extreme shock or crisis or in the most acute of revolutionary episodes. As the 
experience of Germany after 1945 (Berghahn 1986, Schwartz 1991, Djelic 
1998) or the more recent fate of Eastern European and Post Soviet countries 
(Stark and Bruszt 1998, Kitschelt 1999, Jones-Luong 2001) show, blitz-type 
interventions, shock therapies or radical institutional reengineering are bound to 
encounter significant resistance and obstacles that are created in part by robust 
and enduring institutional configurations. They will generally have much less 
impact than anticipated and the persistence of preexisting patterns will be 
stronger than expected. Hence if change is defined as a radical and time bound 
overhaul of the system as a whole, we are indeed quite unlikely to see change.  
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We propose a quite different perspective on institutional change. We argue 
that the succession and combination, over a long period of time, of a series of 
incremental transformations can lead in the end to consequential and significant 
change. Each single one of these incremental transformations may appear quite 
marginal – mitigated and partially absorbed as it is likely to be by the national 
institutional system as a whole. However, the succession and combination of 
multiple and multilevel transformations ultimately and with a longer term view of 
the process adds to the significance and heightens the impact of each single 
transformation.  
The image is that of a minuscule drop of water falling from the vault of a 
cave. In itself, it seems totally insignificant with no impact whatsoever on the 
cave as a whole. However, under given conditions of temperature, the succes-
sion and combination of large numbers of droplets falling upon each other may 
lead to an aggregation of the calcite contained in those drops. After a (long) 
while the result will be the emergence of a thick landscape of innovatively 
shaped stalactites and stalagmites and a radical transformation, one could say, 
of the cave as a whole. 
This image, we argue, is probably closer than the image of the ‘Big Bang’ to 
the way most national institutional systems change and we label our perspec-
tive on institutional change the ‘stalactite model’ of institutional change. National 
institutional configurations cannot dissolve and be replaced by others at the 
snap of fingers. Nevertheless, under repeated, multidirectional and multilevel 
attacks from challenger institutions and rule systems, both through what we call 
below trickle-up and trickle-down trajectories, national configurations may erode 
and be reshaped progressively through time. Instead of all constitutive elements 
changing together at the very same time, one should think of a process where 
one constitutive element after another might be weakened and destabilized. 
The weakness and destabilisation of each constitutive element feeds on that of 
the others, leading in time to a system erosion – all elements ‘giving way’ or 
being transformed at least in part after a while. This, naturally, can be a very 
slow process where change is always associated with resistance and persis-
tence. This may be happening at least as much in an indirect and for some time 
subterranean way as through direct assault on national institutional frames.   
4 Globalisation as Institutional Recombination 
In processes of institutional emergence, decline or change, new configurations 
are rarely created from scratch. Rather, the genesis of institutions in contempo-
rary societies unfolds in general in a form that is closer to ‘bricolage’ than to ex 
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nihilo generation (Offe 1995, Hall and Taylor 1996, March and Olsen 1998). 
Actors build upon, work around, recombine, reinvent and reinterpret logics and 
institutional arrangements that either function elsewhere or with which they are 
familiar. Within the context of nation states, the creation of new institutions is 
likely to be strongly influenced by the state, in the form of political actors or 
agencies (Clemens and Cook 1999). But even there, this should not blind us to 
the impact and significance of other actors.  
The relevance of this idea of ‘bricolage’ (Douglas 1986) becomes only more 
significant when we look at processes of institutional emergence and institution 
building at the transnational level. We suggest, in fact, that turning our attention 
to the transnational level should go hand in hand with a refocusing away from 
the idea of institutional configurations to that of dynamic institutional recombina-
tion. Institution building in the transnational sphere involves several and some-
times multiple actors or groups of actors with mental and action maps originat-
ing from quite different institutional contexts. Very often, those originating con-
texts have a societal or national character (Morgan 2001a, 2000b). Hence, the 
process of institution building at the transnational or cross-national level cannot 
be conceived in total isolation and abstraction from national institutional con-
texts. Multiple national actors extend their national contextual rationalities into 
the international sphere where they interact, confront and negotiate with each 
other.  
4.1 The international organisation: an historical scenario 
Historically, a first and obvious scenario for institutional building in the trans-
national space has been the formal setting up of an international organisation. 
This, naturally, is an old scenario and with a little bit of a stretch the Roman 
Catholic Church could be used as an illustration, and a successful one at that. 
Without going that far back in history, a number of other examples come to 
mind. The League of Nations was an important ancestor, although with ulti-
mately little impact (Murray 1987, Knock 1995).  
In the few years following 1945, the project of structuring the transnational 
space around international organisations regained significance after nearly two 
decades of strong nationalism and protectionism. The United Nations and its 
various divisions, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC 
later to become the OECD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World 
Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, later to become 
the World Trade Organisation) all proceeded from the same logic – although the 
GATT or WTO may have turned out to be more of an hybrid between this first 
scenario and the third one to be described below.  
 
13 
These organisations all had a centralised core, in charge of setting the rules 
and building institutions at an international level. And this centralised core 
directly reflected the interests of national member states – as conveyed by pub-
lic or semi-public types of actors such as representatives of particular national 
governments and polities. In that context, such international organisations were 
in fact little more than the tools of particular nation states and governments, mir-
roring at any one point in time the existing geopolitical balance of power. In 
time, however, the technocratic elite in charge of everyday monitoring and 
management could evolve its own identity that would then not be fully reducible 
to any single national logic.  
These types of international organisations have been more or less suc-
cessful in their attempt at setting the rules of the game on a transnational scale. 
The more successful – the IMF, the World Bank and probably also the GATT or 
later the WTO – have been those with some control over compliance and with 
sufficient means to monitor that the rules they are making are indeed being 
implemented. Control could stem from a degree of dependence of member 
states on the international organisations as well as from the capacity these 
organisations may have to associate rewards with compliance and sanctions 
with non-compliance.  
4.2 A second scenario: supranational markets and regional 
federations 
A second scenario for institution building in the transnational space follows from 
the temptation to create a supranational market, or even a supranational state 
or nation. With a little bit of a stretch, once again, and some degree of historical 
anachronism since a number of them were constituted before the emergence of 
the nation state, empires are the materialisation of such a temptation. In our 
modern age, the most obvious illustrations of this second scenario are con-
structions such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC) or the European Union. There are signs that 
NAFTA may also be travelling that road.  
Here again, the process of rule setting and institution building stems from a 
political, top-down kind of initiative. Public or semi-public actors, governments or 
their representatives are instrumental in that process even though they may not 
always be as predominant as in the first scenario. The scope and reach of those 
centrally engineered constructions goes well beyond, in general, the scope and 
reach of transnational organisations. The new rules and institutions are 
enforceable, in the sense of them being formally and efficiently associated with 
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enforcement mechanisms that put member states under strong pressure to 
comply.  
In fact, the reality and strength of enforcement mechanisms combined with 
the scope of the domain controlled might be the key differentiating features 
between this type of supranational constructions on the one hand and transna-
tional organisations on the other. A supranational construction such as the 
European Union is indeed characterised by the strength of enforcement 
mechanisms and thus by its potential clout and impact over member nations 
and states. One type of enforcement mechanisms are direct controls associated 
positively with rewards and negatively with sanctions. Another type of enforce-
ment mechanism is the reliance on voluntary compliance where member states 
are aware of the overall benefits they draw from belonging to the supranational 
construction and, conversely, realise the dangerous consequences of not 
respecting the terms of a contract they entered of their own will. The European 
Union goes even beyond other supranational constructions in that it grants legal 
rights to individual citizens towards EU political bodies.  
4.3 Self-regulating transnational communities: scenario of the 
future?  
We turn to a third scenario for institution building in the transnational space to 
which we associate the label ‘self-regulating transnational communities’. We 
propose that this scenario has become progressively more widespread in recent 
years. In this third scenario, all actors concerned by a particular type of trans-
national activity come together, generally in non structured and little formalised 
settings, to elaborate and agree upon collective rules of the game (Morgan and 
Engwall 1999, Cutler et al. 1999, Djelic and Bensedrine 2001). In contrast to the 
first two scenarii, public or semi-public actors might be involved in rule setting 
but they are not the only ones. In fact, private actors might take the initiative and 
be quite instrumental for the elaboration of rules and the building of institutions 
as well as for monitoring compliance (Lehmkuhl 2003, McNichol and Bense-
drine 2003).  
Another difference with the two previous scenarii is that the logic at work is 
not one of external control but rather self-disciplining or self-regulation. Instead 
of waiting for public actors to impose an institutional frame and thus orient pri-
vate action, the actors concerned and in particular non governmental and pri-
vate actors, take the initiative and set their own rules. Within an arena or a field 
of transnational activity lacking initially in structuration, all concerned actors 
collaborate in building institutional arrangements that will constrain their own 
actions, behaviours and interactions. The process is one of voluntary and rela-
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tively informal negotiations, the emerging structural arrangements are of a rela-
tively amorphous, fluid and multifocal nature.  
Self-disciplining transnational communities of that sort tend to rely on two 
main categories of enforcement mechanisms. One is voluntary compliance, but 
compliance this time not only of national states and governments but also 
directly of all actors involved in the process. Compliance is voluntary for the 
main reason that these actors define the rules themselves and inflict upon 
themselves the institutional constraints that will bound their own actions and 
interactions. A second enforcement mechanism, socialisation, can be identified 
– although probably more as a potential and an objective than as an already 
existing and concrete reality. Indeed, socialisation can only emerge as an 
enforcement mechanism in a later stage. Rules and institutions have to be con-
structed and agreed upon (the habitualisation or pre-institutionalisation stage 
identified above), actors have to function within that frame for a while (objectifi-
cation), before the double process of socialisation and self-reproduction through 
socialisation can really become operative (sedimentation). The advantage of 
socialisation as an enforcement mechanism is the decreasing need for direct 
controls, and thus for both external rewards and sanctions. Actors that are 
being socialised through a particular institutional frame or in a particular set of 
rules become their own watchdogs. Ultimately, the institutional frame and the 
set of rules should ‘disappear’, to the extent that, after a while, they have a ten-
dency to become neutral and transparent for those actors that function within 
the space they structure.  
Some of the elements of the third scenario for institution building at a trans-
national level are not new. As argued by Lehmkuhl (2003) for example, the 
structuring of commercial arbitration at the transnational level by actors them-
selves – and in particular by private actors – has existed for a long time. One 
could also argue that international cartels, particularly during the interwar period 
but even after in some industries (Cutler et al. 1999, Glimstedt 2001, Lilja and 
Moen 2003), fit within this type of scenario. Self-regulated forms of transnational 
economic coordination are recently going through a period of ‘revival’ after long 
decades when national states had all but established a monopoly over the han-
dling of transnational issues and spaces (Héritier 2002).  
In fact, we propose that there has been an historical evolution overall, since 
1945, in terms of which scenario has been predominant. The early period, in the 
years following the war, was characterised by the multiplication of transnational 
organisations. Then came the time of supranational constructions – particularly 
in Western Europe. This, naturally, is still going on. At the same time, increasing 
empirical evidence points for the recent period in the direction of a greater role 
and place for self-disciplining transnational communities (Braithwaite and Dra-
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hos 2000, Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000, Djelic and Quack 2003). Professions 
are one particular type of such communities but they are far from the only one.  
4.4 Transnational recombination: mode and nature of the process 
In each of these three different scenarii, transnational institution building can be 
analysed as a process of reinterpretation, recombination and bricolage of insti-
tutional fragments from different contextual origins. We suggest that there are 
three different modes in which the rubbing, contestation and recombination of 
different institutional fragments can take place at the transnational level. 
A first, obvious, mode we label here ‘dominant’. In that mode, the building 
of institutions at a transnational level simply reflects one dominant local or 
national model. Rules originating from one particular national space thus shape 
in a rather direct way the transnational space. In a second stage, this local 
turned transnational model is bound to have an impact on a number of other 
national institutional configurations as we will argue below. This overall process 
generally reflects the objective and/or perceived strength of the ‘dominant’ 
nation, which itself depends on a combination of economic, military and geo-
political factors with some degree of ideological propping up. Undeniably, since 
1945, this role of the ‘dominant’ nation has been played by the United States 
and this particular mode of recombination can be referred to as a process of 
Americanisation (Djelic 1998).  
A second mode emerges that we label the ‘negotiated’ mode. Institution 
building in the transnational space can come about through the confrontation or 
‘rubbing against each other’ of multiple locals or nationals, leading to what can 
be described as a process of negotiation. McNichol and Bensedrine (2003) or 
Ventresca et al. (2003) point to the interplay in fact between the ‘negotiated’ and 
the ‘dominant’ mode. All participants to the negotiations are not created equal 
and one of them – here again the United States – looms significantly larger than 
the others in the process. This underscores the ideal typical nature of the differ-
ent modes we identify and the likelihood that they will coexist and interact in real 
life contexts. In fact, while situations of negotiation are rarely perfectly balanced, 
a situation of dominance is on the other hand rarely so extreme as to leave no 
space for at least partial negotiation. In the context of what was described 
above as ‘Americanisation’, for example, what many empirical studies show is 
the concomitant partial alteration, translation and negotiation of the ‘dominant’ 
model when it comes into contact with previously existing and established 
national institutional configurations (Djelic 1998, Zeitlin and Herrigel 2000, 
Amdam et al. forthcoming, Djelic and Quack 2003). 
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Common to illustrations of both the ‘dominant’ and ‘negotiated’ modes is 
the fact that the actors involved – whoever and whatever they are – remain 
strongly embedded in and shaped by the institutional contexts of their home 
countries. These actors tend in fact to extend the actions and strategies used in 
that context and shaped by it to the transnational arena. This, however, is not 
necessarily always the case. The involvement of actors in processes of trans-
national institution building can – particularly if sustained and recurring over 
longer periods of time – lead to a blurring of identities, particularly national ones 
(Morgan 2001a). Once transnational arenas have been structured for a while, 
once transnational institutions and rules of the game shape behaviours and 
interactions, some of the actors concerned come to be more directly affected by 
these transnational institutions than by the institutions of the country they may 
originate from. New actors may also sprout up for which the only referent will be 
the embryonic transnational institutional context where they were born (e.g. 
some transnational NGOs, lobbying organisations created at the European 
level, see Salk et al. 2001).  
Any further process of transnational institution building in that context can-
not anymore fit under the categories of either the ‘dominant’ or the ‘negotiated’ 
mode. What takes place then is what we label, for lack of a better word, an 
‘emergent’ process. Multiple actors with no clear identities and functioning 
themselves at the interface of multiple rule systems, come in collision with each 
other. If we are to follow the metaphorical use of chaos theory in social 
sciences, the result in this case is bound to be unpredictable (Thietart and 
Forgues 1997). Constructions originating from this ‘emergent mode’ tend to 
become detached from their multiple national roots and develop a dynamic of 
their own as a truly transnational space (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). 
The three modes identified here are clearly ideal types. There is bound to 
be, in other words, interaction and interplay between them in real life situations. 
At the same time, we suggest that there has been a shift over time in their rela-
tive importance. This shift parallels to quite a degree the evolution, in terms of 
scenario, identified above. In the immediate post-World War II years, we have 
argued, the main scenario for transnational institution building was the setting 
up of international organisations. During this period, the dominant mode – one 
national model, the American one, imposing itself on a transnational scale – 
was all but overwhelming. The dominant mode has not entirely disappeared 
with the attempts at supranational construction. But such projects, by their very 
nature, meant and required some degree of negotiation between the several 
member nations that were shaping them, generally on a world regional basis. 
Finally, the move towards the third scenario – transnational institution building 
by self-disciplining transnational communities – coincides quite closely with the 
slow assertion of an emergent mode. It seems furthermore to fit particularly the 
case of transnational institution building across world regions – in what gets 
close to being a ‘global’ space.  
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5 Globalisation and National Institutional Change 
Ongoing processes of institutional recombination at the transnational level, as 
described in the previous section, have a high potential to challenge and 
undermine institutional stability and identical reproduction at the national level. 
Transnational institutional frames in the making are likely to challenge, to con-
front and to change – even though slowly and incrementally – national institu-
tional systems. They can do so through direct impact – what we call here 
‘trickle-down’ effects or mechanisms. When transnational organisations or 
supranational constructions (e.g. the WTO, the IMF or the World Bank or the 
European Union) exert pressure directly at the national level on member gov-
ernments to redefine national rules of the game, then we have what we call 
‘trickle-down’ effects or mechanisms.  
The impact can also be more indirect. Through cross-national interactions 
at subsocietal or meso levels – sectors, industries, professions or even from 
region to region – actors are being drawn into social spaces that extend well 
beyond their national context of origin. In that process, those actors are likely to 
be confronted with and to have to function within sets of rules that may be quite 
different from those of their country of origin. Subsocietal actors become the 
vectors and transmission belts through which those new rules are brought into a 
given national space. In certain circumstances, those subsocietal actors may be 
more than mere messengers. They may become real mediators and contribute 
to pushing those new rules up towards the national institutional level, fostering 
in the process a transformation of the national business system or of the 
national business rationality. This path or pattern we associate with ‘trickle-up’ 
effects or mechanisms. 
5.1 Trickle-down trajectories 
The challenge, naturally, may come from transnational organisations or supra-
national constructions. Those organisations and constructions quite often turn 
out to be rule-making bodies and some of them have gained significant and 
direct influence over national polities. This is clearly the case with the European 
Union (Leibfried and Pierson 1995, Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996, Sandholtz 
and Stone Sweet 1998, Plehwe 2001). With respect to the economic realm, 
other transnational organisations such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) or the World Trade Organisation (WTO) should be mentioned. These 
organisations contribute to the diffusion of particular rules of the game, which 
are likely to collide with incumbent rules or practices in many national spaces.  
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Less attention has been paid to the scenario where challenger rules 
emerge from a transnational space lacking formal structure and being, as a 
consequence, less visible. What we have said above about self-disciplining 
transnational communities indicates that rule setting and rule making can also 
take place in transnational fields or arenas lacking structuration in relative 
terms. Actors – all kinds of actors, from private firms to consumers, lobbies, 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) or state representatives – come 
together to negotiate and agree on rules of the game. Examples can be found in 
the regulation of financial markets (Morgan 2001a, Ventresca et al. 2003) or 
international commercial arbitration (Dezalay and Garth 1996, Lehmkuhl 2003). 
Those rules of the game are institutions, to the extent that they structure action 
and economic activity. For the most part, those are cognitive and normative 
institutions (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The rules that emerge or are negotiated 
in that context are essentially norms that are enacted, appropriated and 
enforced by the actors themselves. (ML: took out once sentence here). 
Once transnational institutions or rules are there or in the making, the 
question moves to the conditions in which they may come indeed to trickle-
down to the national level with a potentially significant impact upon incumbent 
national institutions. One important variable appears to be the degree of cen-
trality of a particular country, through its private and public representatives, in 
the process of construction and stabilisation of transnational rules. It seems fair 
to differentiate between at least three main groups of countries in that respect. 
The United States plays quite a unique role even though it does not always 
manage to impose the solution that will best serve its interests. An explanation 
to that special place and role lies in the unique position of geopolitical domi-
nance that has characterised that country after 1945 (Djelic 1998, Braithwaite 
and Drahos 2000). A second group is made up of a few core (and rather rich) 
countries, which are proactive and quite involved in trying to shape the process. 
The third group finally is the larger one and brings together those countries with 
a more passive connection to the process.  
Empirical evidence seems to show that compliance may be more regular, 
once the rules have been agreed upon, within the second group of countries, 
rich core countries. In the third group of countries, appropriation seems to be 
more of an issue and the decoupling between global rules and local practices 
can be quite significant (Meyer et al. 1997a, Meyer et al. 1997b). In the case of 
the United States, geopolitical power allows for irregular and changing patterns 
of compliance even when that country has played a significant role in the proc-
ess of elaboration of global rules (McNichol and Bensedrine 2003, ENS 2001, 
Libération 2002).  
Other variables with an impact on trickle-down trajectories are the nature of 
incumbent rules and the degree of dependence of a particular country on exter-
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nal players. We hypothesise that a country where local rules are weak, either 
because they lack legitimacy, have proven inefficient or a hindrance, are alto-
gether absent or still at a pre-institutionalisation stage, creates more space for 
rules constructed at a transnational level to trickle-down. This can only be rein-
forced in situations of dependence, where a country for example sees the 
granting of financial assistance it badly needs being conditioned upon compli-
ance to a set of transnationally defined rules (Djelic 1998). A special and quite 
different case of dependence should be mentioned here. Direct political 
dependence of national countries on a supranational construction, such as is 
the case in the European Union context, is an obvious path for trickle-down 
mechanisms. This situation naturally creates conditions where the rules defined 
at the supranational level are likely indeed to have a rapid and significant impact 
at the national level. 
5.2 Trickle-up trajectories 
Threats and challenges to national institutional systems may also come from 
below, from subsocietal or subnational levels. Such ‘trickle-up’ trajectories can 
be of two kinds. First, national actors crossing national borders may find that the 
rules of the game with which they are familiar come into collision and some-
times even are in contradiction with rules of the game dominant elsewhere. 
Those national actors could be individuals, groups of individuals, firms, associa-
tions or networks of firms. This type of scenario will be all the more widespread 
that the internationalisation of economic activities and of exchanges in general 
is becoming increasingly dense and intense.   
The opening up of national economies may stimulate a second scenario 
that is parallel but goes the other direction. Foreign actors move into a given 
national space with rules of the game that are quite different from those of local 
actors. A variant of that scenario is when the champions of challenger rules on 
the local or national scene are themselves locals or nationals who are pushing 
for new rules of the game in order to carve a space for themselves. What this is 
all about is the attempt by new or emerging actors, whether local outsiders or 
foreign entrants or even a combination of both, to redefine rules of the game in 
an industry or impose ‘new’ ones in order to enter the field and the game and to 
reshape it to their advantage (Djelic and Ainamo 1999, Lane 2001, Kleiner 
2003).  
Various empirical studies show how this encounter between incumbent and 
challenger rules plays out at subsocietal levels, whether at the level of the firm 
(Lane 2000, Tainio et al. 2001), at the level of an industry (Lilja and Moen 
2003), an organisational field (Kleiner 2003) or at the level of a profession 
(Quack 2000, McKenna et al. 2003). This interplay at the subsocietal level is not 
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neutral for national institutions. Rules of the game may change at the sub-
societal level well before this is institutionalised at the national level. But trans-
formations at the subsocietal level may also reverberate in time at the national 
institutional level. The decision by the German government in 2001 to create a 
Kodex-Kommission in charge of ‘modernising the rules and practices of German 
capitalism’ is a clear case of such a process of post hoc ‘regularisation’ (Le 
Monde, 7 November 2001). The object of this commission is to take stock of 
changes that have already redefined the German economic game and to insti-
tutionalise them at the national level. For some, this may be formally ringing the 
knell of Rhenan capitalism (Institut de l’Entreprise 2001). This raises questions 
about the conditions in which contestation and transformation of incumbent 
rules of the game at the subsocietal level are likely indeed to reflect and impact 
on the national level.  
One such condition seems to be the central position and overall leverage of 
the subsocietal actors concerned by or involved in the collision of rules. 
Changes within core and strategic firms or industries are more likely, ultimately, 
to have some impact on national level institutions. This appears to be particu-
larly true in smaller countries as shown by the cases of Nokia in Finland (Tainio 
et al. 2001) or of the forest industry in Norway and Finland (Lilja and Moen 
2003). In smaller countries, core firms or industries have proportionally more 
clout, strategic importance but also leverage which could explain their more 
direct impact.  
Other important conditions are the strength and legitimacy of those outsid-
ers championing and pushing for challenger rules. In that respect, Anglo-Saxon 
players benefit from something akin to a ‘trademark’ advantage in professional 
fields such as corporate law or management consulting as well as in other 
activities related to banking or financing. This allows them to be more forceful 
and convincing in the promotion of their own sets of rules of the game. Natu-
rally, the strength and legitimacy of those outsiders and challengers will be 
more or less filtered and mitigated by the existence and embeddedness of local 
incumbent rules. Local appropriation will likely be more complex and contested 
in situations where incumbent rules already exist and are deeply embedded – 
when, in other words, local institutional rules have already entered the phase of 
sedimentation.  
Another condition seems important that is not unrelated to those identified 
above. The greater the shock or the more intense the collision, the more likely 
that it will reverberate at the national level. The collision will be more intense if 
subsocietal actors – firms, industries, professions or even possibly regions – 
lack protective buffers or else are in a situation of perceived and self-acknowl-
edged crisis. The lack of protection can be due to the immaturity of the local 
field. It can be strategically engineered, either by political authorities or by the 
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actors themselves, through deregulation for example or a lowering of trade or 
other protective barriers (Djelic and Ainamo 1999). It will also be related, natu-
rally, to the strength of the push coming from outsiders and challenger rules. A 
perceived and self-acknowledged situation of crisis will tend to correspond, on 
the other hand, to a high degree of dissatisfaction with incumbent rules, either 
because these rules do not seem to coevolve with environmental conditions 
and/or because they narrow the opportunities of local and incumbent actors in a 
changing world.  
We argue that under these conditions – or a subset thereof – transforma-
tions in rules of the game that were initially happening at a subsocietal level are 
likely to have an impact and reverberate, after a while, at the national level.  
6 Conclusion 
We have argued in this paper that faced with the ongoing debates on globalisa-
tion, societal institutionalism in its traditional form is showing its limits. Central 
elements of this type of approach will have to be reconsidered and reformulated 
if it is to contribute to ongoing debates on global governance. In our view, the 
focus of analysis has to shift away from the present concern with national con-
figurations towards attempts at understanding transnational recombination. 
In this paper, we have made suggestions on how to extend societal institu-
tionalism so that it could be better prepared for this task. We point in three 
directions in particular. First, we insist on the necessity to move away from a 
focus on institutions and towards the double idea of institutionalisation and de-
institutionalisation as ongoing processes. Then, we insist on the need to bring 
actors back in. We suggest that it is particularly important to look at the interplay 
between actors and institutions at those moments of fragility for institutions 
when external pressure combines with internal disruptions. Hence, the inter-
faces between national and transnational (or foreign) actors and institutions 
deserve, we argue, great attention. Finally, we bring in a new perspective on 
institutional change, overcoming the sterile dichotomy between the impossibility 
of change on the one hand and its extremely rare occurrence in the form of 
radical overhaul on the other. Our proposition is that the succession and combi-
nation, over a long period of time, of a series of incremental and sometimes 
minor transformations could lead in the end to consequential and significant 
change. This we call the ‘stalactite model’ of change.  
Building on this reformulation of societal institutionalism, we are able to ex-
tend its usefulness to get at a better understanding of the transnational sphere 
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and of globalisation. We reinterpret globalisation as multilayered processes of 
transnational institution building and recombination. We can also take seriously 
the challenge that globalisation hence reinterpreted represents for national or 
societal institutions. Globalisation as transnational institution building and re-
combination creates pressure at the national level, through different channels 
and following different trajectories. The multiplication of those points of interface 
between the national and the transnational where pressure is being felt  creates 
the conditions, through time, for a ‘stalactite’ type process of change that ulti-
mately may be quite significant and consequential.  
At the methodological level, the analysis of processes of ‘stalactite change’ 
requires not only a shift in research design from a focus on country cases or 
even country comparisons to the analysis of linkages between the international 
and national spheres. It also calls for a more frequent use of historical and lon-
gitudinal research designs and methodology. Empirical studies need to encom-
pass the multi-directional causalities between actors and institutions, and 
between the national and transnational level. In the past, a narrow definition of 
‘path dependency’ had led societal institutionalism, as far as it has undertaken 
longitudinal studies, to trace existing institutions back to the past. The challenge 
for future studies is to take a more open approach which also considers the 
alternative directions which institutional development can take at certain points 
and the unintended consequences which might result from emergent processes 
over longer periods of time. A coordination and matching of cross-sectional and 
longitudinal studies of similar and related phenomena at various levels could 
help to make a first step in this direction. 
With the revisions and extensions suggested in this paper, societal institu-
tionalism can contribute, we believe, to a better understanding of the globalisa-
tion phenomenon. Bringing institutions back into the transnational arena makes 
for a richer debate on globalisation. Instead of appearing as an a-historical, 
impersonal and neutral force, the significance and specific features of this 
recent period of internationalisation of economic activity are brought to the fore 
which have to do with a sustained level both of institutional change in the 
national context and of institution building and recombination in the trans-
national space. Discussions about the internationalisation of exchanges, flows 
of goods, money, technology, practices, organisations and people (e.g. Ohmae 
1990, Sassen 1998, Giddens 2000, Guillén 2001) appear less fundamental from 
this point of view. At the very same time, pointing to the tight connections 
between institutions and globalisation should allow us to make a contribution to 
the institutionalist literature. By taking globalisation seriously and pointing to its 
institutional dimension, we can reconcile the idea of institutional embeddedness 
with processes of change and emergence and therefore open new venues for 
the institutionalist perspective. 
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